In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Germany had been left with no private communications link between Berlin and North America, but in the interest of promoting peace, the neutral United States had agreed to send encrypted German messages in exchange for a promise that they only contained run-of-the-mill diplomatic instructions.
Oblivious to its content, he dutifully wired it to Copenhagen. From there, it was transmitted to London and then to the German embassy in Washington, D. By January 19, Eckardt had received it in Mexico City. Unbeknownst to the Americans, British intelligence had been secretly tapping into the U. On January 17—two days before the telegram arrived in Washington—a British cryptanalyst named Nigel de Grey decoded the note.
Protocol demanded that Room 40 immediately share its intelligence with the British foreign office, but Captain Hall chose to keep the Zimmermann Telegram under wraps for several weeks. The British hoped that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would be enough to draw the United States into the war, but when the program finally began on February 1, President Wilson limited himself to severing diplomatic relations with Germany.
It was only then that Hall decided to reveal the ace up his sleeve. In order to conceal the original source of the document, the British foreign office got its hands on a second copy of the Zimmermann Telegram from when it had been transmitted between Washington, D. Claiming they had originally intercepted it in Mexico, they then presented it to the American embassy in London.
London was betting that Germany's use of unrestricted submarine warfare - attacking merchant shipping - would be enough to draw America into the War. When the signs were that an extra push might be needed, it was decided to deploy the Zimmermann Telegram.
Room 40 asked one of its contacts to get hold of a copy of anything sent to the German embassy in Mexico from the US. This provided another copy of the telegram. Britain could then plausibly claim this was how it had got hold of the message and get round the problem of admitting it was spying on its friends.
Britain also had to convince the Americans that the message had not been concocted as part of a ruse to get them into the War. Eventually, the US obtained its own copy from the Western Union telegraphic company, and De Grey then decoded it himself in front of a representative at the US embassy in London.
This meant technically all parties could claim that it had been decoded on US territory. The telegram was then leaked to the American press and published to general amazement on 1 March with credit attached to the American Secret Service rather than the British to avoid awkward questions of British manipulation.
Whatever scepticism was left was dispelled when Zimmermann himself took the odd move of confirming he had sent it. A month later, America was in the War. It would be too much to claim the Zimmermann Telegram single-handedly brought America into the War. Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare can take more credit for that. But the telegram was useful for convincing the American public that it should be sending its men over to Europe to fight.
The telegram had proved the perfect justification for a change of policy and to convince some of the sceptics. It was, many believed, the single greatest intelligence triumph for Britain in World War One.
It was also an early sign of the potential impact of intercepting communications, a lesson which the few British and American officials in on the real story were determined to learn from as they set about building their capability.
Early in World War Two, before America had formally entered the War, it would send a team of its best code-breakers on a clandestine mission to Britain to establish a relationship with their counterparts. The Road to Bletchley Park exhibition at the former wartime site features a copy of the Zimmermann Telegram and details of its role. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace.
We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.
Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.
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